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Information Leakage Neutralization for the
Multi-Antenna Non-Regenerative Relay-Assisted
Multi-Carrier Interference Channel
Zuleita Ho Member, IEEE, Eduard Jorswieck Senior Member, IEEE and Sabrina Gerbracht
Abstract— In heterogeneous dense networks where spectrum is
shared, users privacy remains one of the major challenges. On a
multi-antenna relay-assisted multi-carrier interference channel,
each user shares the spectral and spatial resources with all
other users. When the receivers are not only interested in their
own signals but also in eavesdropping other users’ signals,
the cross talk on the spectral and spatial channels becomes
information leakage. In this paper, we propose a novel secrecy
rate enhancing relay strategy that utilizes both spectral and
spatial resources, termed as information leakage neutralization.
To this end, the relay matrix is chosen such that the effective
channel from the transmitter to the colluding eavesdropper is
equal to the negative of the effective channel over the relay to the
colluding eavesdropper and thus the information leakage to zero.
Interestingly, the optimal relay matrix in general is not block-
diagonal which encourages users’ encoding over the frequency
channels. We proposed two information leakage neutralization
strategies, namely efficient information leakage neutralization
(EFFIN) and local-optimized information leakage neutralization
(LOPTIN). EFFIN provides a simple and efficient design of relay
processing matrix and precoding matrices at the transmitters
in the scenario of limited power and computational resources.
LOPTIN, despite its higher complexity, provides a better sum
secrecy rate performance by optimizing the relay processing
matrix and the precoding matrices jointly. The proposed methods
are shown to improve the sum secrecy rates over several state-
of-the-art baseline methods.
Index Terms— Interference relay channel; Interference neu-
tralization; Non-potent relay; Full-duplex relay; Amplify-and-
forward relay; secrecy rate; worst-case secrecy rate; frequency
selective; multi-antenna systems; colluding eavesdroppers
I. INTRODUCTION
The trend of future wireless network systems is towards
spectrum sharing over different wireless infrastructures such
as LTE networks, smart grid sensor networks and WiMAX net-
works. With isolated wireless infrastructures, such as multiple
non-cooperating LTE cells (as shown in Figure 1), ensuring
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Fig. 1. Three overlapping LTE cells. The sum secrecy rates over the cells
can be improved if a smart multi-antenna relay is introduced into the system.
The emphasized arrows from BS 1 to the smart relay in the middle and then
to UE 1 illustrate that desired signal strength (together with the direct channel
path in red) can be boosted by choosing an appropriate relay strategy. The
emphasized arrows from BS 2 to the smart relay and then to UE 1 illustrate
that information leakage (shown by a dashed arrow in blue) can be neutralized
by choosing the relay strategy appropriately.
data security remains a major technical challenge. While cryp-
tography techniques are employed in most established commu-
nication standards, physical layer security techniques provide
an alternative approach when the communicating front-ends
are of limited computation capability and are not able to carry
out standard cryptography methods such as symmetric key and
asymmetric key encryption. These applications include but are
not limited to ubiquitous or pervasive computing [2].
With the high demand of wireless applications in recent
years, the issues of communication security become ever more
important. Physical layer security techniques [3]–[5] provide
an additional protection to the conventional secure transmis-
sion methods using cryptography. As early as four decades
ago, the seminal work on the secrecy capacity on the wire-
tap channel [6] - the most fundamental model consisting of
one source node, one destination node and one eavesdropper -
started the era of research on physical layer security. Extensive
analysis and designs have been conducted ever since; physical
layer security results can be found in [3]–[5] and recent tutorial
papers [7], [8].
With advantages such as increased cell coverage and trans-
mission rates, relays are incorporated into the standards of
current wireless infrastructures. The wireless resources in these
systems are frequently shared by many users/subscribers and a
potential malicious user in the system can lead to compromised
confidentiality. Many novel strategies have been proposed to
improve the secrecy in
• relay systems, including cooperative jamming (CJ) [9]–
[11], noise-forwarding (NF) [12], a mixture of CJ and NF
[13], signal-forwarding strategies such as amplify-and-
forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF) [14]–[16]1.
• multi-carrier systems [20]–[22] and multi-carrier relay
systems with external eavesdropper(s) [15], [23].
Yet, a joint optimization of secrecy rates over the frequency-
spatial resources in a relay-assisted multi-user interference
channel (with internal eavesdroppers) remains an open pro-
blem, as considered here.
We assume that the relay employs an amplify-and-forward
(AF) strategy which provides flexibility in implementation
as the relay is transparent to the modulation and coding
schemes and induces negligible signal processing delays [24].
The novel notion of relay-without-delays, also known as
instantaneous relays if the relays are memoryless [25]–[28],
refers to relays that forward signals consisting of both current
symbol and symbols in the past, instead of only the past
symbols as in conventional relays. As shown in Figure 2,
the instantaneous relay models a layer-1 repeaters connected
networks (such as LTE network and WiMAX networks [29])
and helps us analyze the system performance of nowadays
repeaters connected networks2.
In order to provide secure transmission over relay-assisted
multi-carrier networks, we propose a relay strategy termed
as information leakage neutralization which by choosing re-
lay forwarding strategies algebraically neutralizes information
leakage from each transmitter in the network to each eaves-
dropper on each frequency subcarrier. This method is adopted
from a technique on relay networks, termed as interference
neutralization (IN). IN has been applied to eliminate interfe-
rence in various single-carrier systems, such as deterministic
channels [31], [32], two-hop relay channels [24], [33], [34] and
instantaneous relay channels [35]. Our prior work shows that
IN is effective in improving secrecy rates in a two-hop wiretap
channel [36]. Information leakage neutralization differs from
previous works above as shown in the following.
• Conventional physical layer security methods that rely on
the confusion of eavesdroppers, such as artificial noise
forwarding, require additional wiretap codes for pro-
tection [37]. Information leakage neutralization ensures
secrecy by setting the equivalent leakage channel to zero
and thus does not require an additional wiretap code.
Moreover, information leakage neutralization offers an
additional advantage of desired signal power amplificati-
on which is not taken into consideration in artificial noise
forwarding methods.
• Information leakage neutralization provides a systematic
way of optimizing the secrecy rates by simplifying the
1All aforementioned works assume that the relays are cooperative and
trusted. For secure transmission strategies with untrusted relays, please refer
to [17]–[19].
2In modern networks such as LTE, wireless links are often connected using
boosters or layer-1 repeaters (simple amplifiers) [30]. If the time consumed
for the signals to travel from a source to a repeater or from a repeater to a
destination is counted as one unit, then the total time for the signal to travel
from a source to a destination is two units - the same amount of time for the
signal to travel from a source through a smart AF relay to a destination.
highly non-convex secrecy rates expression to a conven-
tional single log-determinant function. In the scenarios
of high SNR or strong information leakage, the secrecy
rates are maximized when the information leakage is
zero which is guaranteed by the information leakage
neutralization.
• With the assumption of colluding eavesdroppers and
multiple antennas at the relay, the neutralization proposed
here over multi-carrier systems is of significantly higher
complexity than the single-carrier system in the previous
works [35], [36].
• The problem of information leakage neutralization is
fundamentally different from interference neutralization.
This can be realized in a simple example. Assume that
we have two transmitter-receiver pairs. Transmitter one
transmits only on the first subcarrier whereas the second
transmitter only transmits on the second subcarrier. In
interference neutralization, no work needs to be done
because there is no interference. However, for information
leakage neutralization, the relay must neutralize the lea-
kage of user one’s signal on subcarrier one at the second
receiver. Hence, the problem studied here differs from
[35].
The contributions and outline of this manuscript are sum-
marized as follows:
• We transform a general and complicated sum secrecy rate
optimization problem on a relay-assisted multi-carrier
interference channel with mutually eavesdropping users
to an optimization-ready formulation. Systematic optimi-
zation techniques can then be applied to solve for the
sum-secrecy-rate-optimal relay strategies and precoding
matrices at the transmitters. The achievable secrecy sum
rate function of the aforementioned multi-carriers system
is significantly different from the single-carrier problem
in our previous work [35].
• An illustrative example is given in Section II-A for a basic
setting to highlight the efficiency of information leakage
neutralization.
• We propose a novel idea of information leakage neu-
tralization strategies in Section III-A. These strategies
neutralize information leakage from each user to its
colluding eavesdroppers on each frequency-spatial chan-
nel. The resulting secrecy rate expression is significantly
simplified. Detailed analyzes for the multi-carrier infor-
mation leakage neutralization methods are provided. In
particular, the minimum number of antennas at the relay
for complete information leakage neutralization is com-
puted in Proposition 1. The required number of antennas
depends on the number of data streams sent by each
user, the number of frequency subcarriers and the number
of users in the system. Relevant to applications where
relay power must be reserved, the minimum power at the
relay required for information leakage neutralization is
computed in Proposition 2.
• We propose an efficient and simple information leaka-
ge neutralization strategy (EFFIN) which ensures se-
cure transmissions in the scenarios of limited power
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Fig. 2. The wireless relay-assisted network with layer one repeaters and
one smart relay is shown in subfigure (a). The dotted lines demonstrate the
equivalent links between a source and a destination taking into account the
presence of the repeaters. All paths from source to destination nodes take two
time slots (through either the smart relay or repeaters). The equivalent channel
is established in subfigure (b) by replacing the relay as an instantaneous relay.
Information going through the instantaneous relay arrives at the destinations
at the same time as over the direct links.
and computational resources at relay and transmitters.
With sufficient power at the relay, we propose an local-
optimized information leakage neutralization technique
(LOPTIN) to maximize the secrecy rates while ensuring
zero information leakage.
• The achievable secrecy rates from proposed strategies
EFFIN and LOPTIN are compared to several baseline
strategies by numerical simulations in Section V. Baseline
1 is a scenario where the relay is a layer-1 repeater and
baseline 2 is a scenario with no relay. Simulation results
show that the proposed strategies outperform the baseline
strategies significantly in various operating SNRs.
A. Notations
The set Ca×b denotes a set of complex matrices of size
a by b and is shortened to Ca when a = b. The notation
N (A) is the null space of A. The operator ⊗ denotes
the Kronecker product. The superscripts T, H, † represent
transpose, Hermitian transpose and Moore-Penrose inverse
respectively whereas the superscript ∗ denotes the conjugation
operation. The Euclidean norm for scalars is written as |.|. The
trace of matrix A is denoted as tr(A). Vectorization stacks the
columns of a matrix A to form a long column vector denoted
as vec(A). The function C(A) denotes the log- determinant
function of matrix A, log2 det (A). The identity and zero
matrices of dimension K × K are written as IK and 0K .
The vector ei represents a column vector with zero elements
everywhere and one at the i-th position. The notation [A]ml
denotes the m-th row and l-th column element of the matrix
A. The notation pa:b, 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ n, denotes a vector which
has elements [pa, pa+1, . . . , pb] where p = [p1, . . . , pn].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In the following subsection, we give an example of an
interference relay channel with two transmitter-receiver pairs
where the relay has two antennas and all nodes share two
frequency subcarriers. We shall illustrate that the conventional
assumption of block diagonal relay matrix (which maximizes
achievable rates in peaceful systems) cannot be adopted a-
priori when secrecy rates are considered.
A. An example of two transmitters on two frequencies with
two antennas at the relay
Transmitter (TX) i, i = 1, 2, transmits symbols xi ∈ CM×1
which are spread over M frequency subcarriers by precoding
matrix Pi. For the ease of notation, we assume that the
precoding matrix Pi is a square matrix Pi ∈ CM . When
TX i transmits Si ≤ M symbols, then zeros are padded in xi
so that its dimension is always M × 1 and correspondingly
zero columns are padded in Pi. We assume that the TXs
do not overload the system and therefore Si is smaller than
or equal to the number of frequency subcarriers, here two.
Note that Pi may have low row rank when certain subcarriers
are not used. For example, if TX i transmits one symbol on
subcarrier 1 but nothing on subcarrier 2, then Pi = [a, 0; 0, 0]
for some complex scalar a. If Pi is diagonal, then each symbol
is only sent on one frequency. Denote the m-th transmit
symbol of TX i as xi(m) which is randomly generated,
mutually independent and with covariance matrix I2. The
precoding matrix Pi satisfies the transmit power constraint
of TX i: tr
(
PiP
H
i
)
≤ Pmaxi . Denote the channel gain from
transmitter i to receiver (RX) j on frequency m as hji(m). For
simplicity of the example, we let Si equal two. The received
signal of TX i is a vector whose m-th element is the received
signal on the m-th frequency subcarrier,
yi =
[
yi(1)
yi(2)
]
=
2
∑
j=1
[
hij(1) 0
0 hij(2)
]
Pj
[
xj(1)
xj(2)
]
+
[
ni(1)
ni(2)
]
.
The circular Gaussian noise with unit variance received on
the m-th subcarrier at RX i is denoted as ni(m). If a relay
with two antennas is introduced into the system, it receives the
broadcasting signal from TXs and forwards them to RXs. We
denote the received signal at the relay as a stacked vector of
the received signal at each frequency m, with yr(m) ∈ C2×1
representing the received signal on frequency m and the a-th
element in yr(m) representing the signal at the a-th antenna:
yr =
[
yr(1)
yr(2)
]
=
2
∑
j=1
[
f j(1) 02×1
02×1 f j(2)
]
Pj
[
xj(1)
xj(2)
]
+
[
nr(1)
nr(2)
]
where nr(m) ∈ C2×1 is a circular Gaussian noise vector
received at frequency m with identity covariance matrix and
f j(m) is the complex vector channel from TX j to the relay
on frequency m. The relay processes the received signal yr by
a multiplication of matrix R ∈ C4 and forwards the signal to
the RXs. Denote the channel from relay to RX i on frequency
3
m by gi(m) ∈ C2×1. At RX i, the received signal is
yi =
2
∑
j=1
([
hij(1) 0
0 hij(2)
]
+
[
gHi (1) 01×2
01×2 g
H
i (2)
]
R
[
f j(1) 02×1
02×1 f j(2)
])
Pj
[
xj(1)
xj(2)
]
+
[
gHi (1) 01×2
01×2 g
H
i (2)
]
R
[
nr(1)
nr(2)
]
+
[
ni(1)
ni(2)
]
.
Denote channel matrices
Hij =
[
hij(1) 0
0 hij(2)
]
, GHi =
[
gHi (1) 01×2
01×2 g
H
i (2)
]
,
Fj =
[
f j(1) 02×1
02×1 f j(2)
]
,
and the equivalent channel from TX j to RX i as
H̄ij = Hij +G
H
i RFj . (1)
With circular Gaussian transmit symbols xi, the following rate
of TX-RX pair 1 is achievable,
r1(R) = C
(
I2 +H̄11 P1 P
H
1 H̄
H
11 ·Ξ−11
)
(2)
where Ξ1 is the covariance of the interference and noise
Ξ1 = H̄12 P2 P
H
2 H̄
H
12 + G
H
1 RR
H G1 + I2. Consider that
RX 2 is an eavesdropper. We compute the worst-case scenario
in which RX 2 decodes all other symbols perfectly before
decoding the messages from TX 1 and RX 2 sees a multiple-
input-multiple-output (MIMO) channel and decodes messages
x1(1) and x1(2) utilizing both frequencies (with a minimum-
mean-squared-error (MMSE) receive filter for example) in (3)
at the top of next page. An achievable rate is then r2←1(R) =
C
(
I2 +H̄21 P1 P
H
1 H̄
H
21
(
GH2 RR
H G2 + I2
)−1
)
. An
achievable secrecy rate of TX-RX pair 1 is then its achievable
rate r1(R) minus the leakage rate to RX 2 r2←1(R) [38]:
rs1(R) = (r1(R)− r2←1(R))+ (4)
The relay processing matrix is defined as
R =
[
R11 R12
R21 R22
]
(5)
where each submatrix block Rmn forwards signals from
frequency n to frequency m. In a peaceful MIMO interference
relay channel, R bares a block diagonal structure, R12 =
R21 = 02. The intuition is that relays should not generate
cross talk over frequency channels. However, it is not trivial
to examine the effect of R12 and R21 on secrecy rates as
illustrated below and the conventional block diagonal structure
should not be a-priori assumed.
As a numerical example, we compute the secrecy rates with
the following randomly generated channels given in Table I.
The values are generated with Gaussian distribution with
zero mean and unit variance. We set the precoding matrices
of TX 1 and TX 2 to be
P1 =
[
1 0
1 0
]
, P2 =
[
1 4
−4 1
]
which means that TX 1 transmits only one data stream on both
subcarriers and TX 2 transmits two data streams spread over
both frequency subcarriers with orthogonal sequences. With
relay matrix RIN (see Table I) a sum secrecy rate of 3.4104 is
achievable whereas with block diagonal matrix RIN,d the sum
secrecy rate is 3.1881. A block diagonal relay matrix does not
always improve secrecy rate and therefore in the following we
assume a general non-block-diagonal structure R. In fact, the
relay matrix RIN is chosen such that the secrecy leakage is
zero: (H12 +G
H
1 RF2)P2 = 0 and (H21 +G
H
2 RF1)P1 =
0. Thus, the secrecy rate from (4) can be simplified to
rs1 = C
(
I2 +H̄11 P1 P
H
1 H̄
H
11
(
GH1 RR
H G1 + I2
)−1
)
.
where H̄11 is defined in (1).
This motivates our following proposition on information
leakage neutralization techniques. Interestingly, with informa-
tion leakage neutralization, we can simplify the optimization
problem significantly. The idea is to set the information
leakage from each TX at each frequency to zero, in particular,
by setting the equivalent channel of x1 from TX 1 to RX 2
and vice versa in (3) to zero,



(
H12 +G
H
1 RF2
)
P2 = 0
(
H21 +G
H
2 RF1
)
P1 = 0 .
(6)
With the properties of the Kronecker product, (6) can be
written as
B vec(R) = b . (7)
where B =
[
(F2 P2)
T ⊗GH1 ; (F1 P1)T ⊗GH2
]
and b =
− [vec(H12 P2); vec(H21 P1)]. The stacked matrix B in the
above equation is a fat matrix3. We obtain the relay matrix
that can perform information leakage neutralization:
vec(R) = BH
(
BBH
)−1
b . (8)
Substitute the channel realizations in Table I into the above
equation and reverse the vectorization operation, we obtain
the relay matrix RIN (please refer to the table for numerical
values).
Remark 1: If the precoding matrices {Pi} are invertible,
then the relay matrix R obtained using (8) is block diagonal. A
block diagonal relay matrix means that the relay sets cross talk
over frequency subcarriers to zero and due to the interference
leakage neutralization, the interference from TXs on the same
frequency is also zero. This results in KM parallel channels
without interference. We propose in Section IV-A a suboptimal
but very efficient algorithm which optimizes the achievable
rates in this case4.
In fact, the matrix in (8) is not unique, any matrix which is a
sum of vec(R) in (8) and a vector in the null space of B can
3Care must be taken when users send less than M data streams (when Pi
has zero columns. More discussion is provided later in Proposition 2).
4The achievable rates here are secrecy rates as the information leakage is
zero.
4
y2←1 =
([
h21(1) 0
0 h21(2)
]
+
[
gH2 (1) 01×2
01×2 g
H
2 (2)
]
R
[
f1(1) 02×1
02×1 f1(2)
])
P1
[
x1(1)
x1(2)
]
+
[
gH2 (1) 01×2
01×2 g
H
2 (2)
]
R
[
nr(1)
nr(2)
]
+
[
n2(1)
n2(2)
] (3)
TABLE I
RANDOMLY GENERATED CHANNEL REALIZATIONS FOR A TWO USER TWO FREQUENCY INTERFERENCE RELAY CHANNEL WITH TWO ANTENNAS AT
RELAY AND SINGLE ANTENNA AT TXS AND RXS.
H11 =
[
0.5129 + 0.4605i 0
0 0.3504 + 0.0950i
]
, H21 =
[
0.4337 + 0.0709i 0
0 0.1160 + 0.0078i
]
H12 =
[
0.3693 + 0.0336i 0
0 0.1922 + 0.4714i
]
, H22 =
[
0.1449 + 0.0718i 0
0 0.6617 + 0.0432i
]
G1 =



0.4460 + 0.5281i 0
0.5083 + 0.5729i 0
0 0.3608 + 0.1733i
0 0.3365 + 0.0861i



, G2 =



0.3933 + 0.0111i 0
0.8044 + 0.2331i 0
0 0.9339 + 0.7859i
0 0.2268 + 0.4107i



F1 =



0.1194 + 0.8624i 0
0.6344 + 0.1582i 0
0 0.6012 + 0.6261i
0 0.1176 + 0.8351i



, F2 =



0.9404 + 0.2720i 0
0.4156 + 0.9280i 0
0 0.9213 + 0.8129i
0 0.5420 + 0.1664i



R
IN =



−0.0364 − 0.0035i −0.1793 − 0.0233i 0.0234 − 0.0575i 0.0574 + 0.0596i
−0.1046 + 0.0925i −0.2837 − 0.0390i −0.0832− 0.0249i 0.0029 + 0.1567i
0.2729 + 0.0708i −0.1376 + 0.1714i −0.3130− 0.2977i 0.2012 − 0.1606i
0.0529 + 0.0099i −0.1388 + 0.0348i −0.4690− 0.3154i −0.0414 − 0.1751i



R
IN,d =



−0.0364− 0.0035i −0.1793 − 0.0233i 0 0
−0.1046 + 0.0925i −0.2837 − 0.0390i 0 0
0 0 −0.3130 − 0.2977i 0.2012 − 0.1606i
0 0 −0.4690 − 0.3154i −0.0414 − 0.1751i



R
IN,z =



−0.2709 + 0.2267i −0.0820 + 0.1738i −0.0770 + 0.0704i −0.1357 + 0.1183i
−0.1509 + 0.0212i −0.3225− 0.4885i −0.2088 − 0.0485i 0.6810 + 0.1046i
0.2459 + 0.1223i −0.1315 + 0.0682i −0.2702 − 0.2781i 0.2683− 0.2842i
−0.0155 + 0.1640i −0.2285− 0.0472i −0.5114 − 0.2436i −0.0346 − 0.1960i



also neutralize information leakage,
vec(R) = BH
(
BBH
)−1
b+ z, (9)
where z ∈ N (B). With the channel realizations given in
Table I, we can generate another matrix RIN,z which achieves
a higher secrecy rate 4.1553, a 17.8% increase of secrecy
rate by optimization over z. This motivates us to investigate
an efficient method to find z and consequently R which
neutralizes information leakage and optimizes the secrecy rate
at the same time.
Remark 2: With the optimization over z, the relay matrix
is no longer block diagonal which couples the frequency
channels. Although the problem is more complicated, we have
shown in the above example that one can get a better secrecy
rate performance. In Section IV-B, we propose an iterative
sum secrecy rates optimization over the relay matrix R and
the precoding matrices {Pi}.
In the following section, we illustrate how the relay matrix
can be chosen carefully to amplify the desired signal strength
and at the same time neutralize information leakage in the
multi-user scenario.
III. GENERAL MULTI-USER MULTI-ANTENNA
MULTI-CARRIER SCENARIO
In this section, we let the number of TXs and RXs be K ≥
2. The TXs and RXs have single antenna and the relay has
N antennas. Let the number of frequency subcarriers be M .
Denote the complex channel from TX i to RX j, as a diagonal
matrix Hji ∈ CM and the complex channel from TX i to relay
as Fi ∈ CNM×M and from relay to RX j as Gj ∈ CMN×M .
The signal received at the relay is,
yr =
K
∑
i=1
Fi Pi xi +nr (10)
where Fi = diag (f i(1), . . . , f i(M)) and xi ∈ CM×1 are the
circular Gaussian transmit symbols from TX i, with zero mean
and identity covariance matrix. The matrix Pi ∈ CM satisfies
the power constraint:
tr
(
Pi P
H
i
)
≤ Pmaxi . (11)
With AF strategy, the relay multiplies the received signal yr
on the left by processing matrix R and transmits Ryr. The
transmit power of the relay is constrained by Pmaxr ,
tr
(
R
(
K
∑
i=1
FiPiP
H
i F
H
i + IMN
)
RH
)
≤ Pmaxr . (12)
The received signal at RX j is
yj =
K
∑
i=1
(
Hji +G
H
j RFi
)
Pi xi +G
H
j Rnr + nj (13)
where nj is the circular Gaussian noise at RX j with
zero mean and identity covariance matrix and Gj =
5
diag(gj(1), . . . ,gj(M)). For the ease of notation, we define
the equivalent channel from i to j as
H̄ji = Hji +G
H
j RFi (14)
and its (f,m)-element is [H̄ji]fm = hji + g
H
j (f)Rfm f i(m)
which is the equivalent channel from TX i to RX j frequency
f on frequency m.
Each RX is not only interested in decoding its own signal
but also eavesdropping from other TXs. In the following, we
define the worst case achievable secrecy rate with colluding
eavesdroppers. For messages xi, all RXs except RX i collabo-
rate to form an eavesdropper with multiple antennas and the
message xi goes through a multi-carrier MIMO channel to the
colluding eavesdroppers. A worst case secrecy rate is then to
assume that all other messages xj , j 6= i are decoded perfectly
and subtracted before decoding xi. The received signals at RX
i and the colluding eavesdroppers are



































yi =
K
∑
k=1
H̄ik Pk xk +G
H
i Rnr + ni
y−i =










H̄1i
...
H̄(i−1)i
H̄(i+1)i
...
H̄Ki










Pi xi+










GH1
...
GHi−1
GHi+1
...
GHk










Rnr +










n1
...
ni−1
ni+1
...
nK










= H̄−i Pi xi+G
H
−iRnr +n−i .
(15)
The secrecy rate of TX-RX pair i is [38] given in (16) at the
top of next page. Recall from (14) that the equivalent channel
from Tx j to Rx i H̄ij is a function of the relay processing
matrix R, H̄ij = Hij +G
H
i RFj . The optimization of the
aforementioned secrecy rates is highly complicated due to
their non-convex structure. In the following, we propose the
information leakage neutralization technique [35] which is
able to neutralize all information leakage to all eavesdroppers
in the air by choosing the relay strategy in a careful manner.
As illustrated in the previous section, with information lea-
kage neutralization, the secrecy rate expression (16) can be
simplified to
rsi = C
(
IM +H̄ii Pi P
H
i H̄
H
ii
(
GHi RR
H Gi + IM
)−1
)
.
(17)
In the following section, we illustrate how we can choose R
to achieve a secrecy rate as such.
A. Information Leakage Neutralization
We choose R such that the equivalent channel of message
xi to the eavesdropper in (15) is neutralized to zero. The chal-
lenge of information leakage neutralization in multi-subcarrier
environment as compared to the single-subcarrier case [35] is
that the information leakage neutralization constraints must be
modified to incorporate frequency sharing:
(
Hji +G
H
j RFi
)
Pi = 0, i, j = 1, . . . ,K, i 6= j.
(18)
Note that we consider the most general scenario where TX-
RX pairs may only use part of the spectrum and send less
than M data streams and thus Pi may have zero rows and
zero columns. In the following, we show the dependency of
the number of antennas at the relay for information leakage
neutralization on these system parameters.
Proposition 1: The number of antennas at the relay, N ,
required to neutralize all information leakage from each of
the K TX-RX pairs at each frequency subcarrier, in a total
of M subcarriers, satisfies
N ≥
√
√
√
√
K − 1
M
K
∑
i=1
Si (19)
where Si is the number of data streams sent by TX i .
For the proof, please refer to Appendix I. Proposition 1 offers
the minimum number of antennas required to ensure secrecy
which depends on the number of TX-RX pairs K , the number
of subcarriers M and the number of data streams transmitted
Si.
• If every TX employs full frequency multiplexing Si =
M , we have then
N ≥
√
√
√
√
K − 1
M
K
∑
i=1
M =
√
K(K − 1). (20)
As N is an integer, we have N ≥ K which is the same
criteria as in the flat-fading case [35].
• If every TX sends Si = aM data streams and 0 ≤ a ≤ 1,
we have then
N ≥
√
√
√
√
K − 1
M
K
∑
i=1
aM =
√
aK(K − 1). (21)
For example, in a scenario of K = 3 TXs, M =
16 frequency subcarriers and each TX transmits Si =
8 data streams
(
a = 12
)
, the relay must have at least
⌈√
1
2 · 3 · 2
⌉
=
⌈√
3
⌉
= 2 antennas to completely
remove any information leakage from any TX to any
RX. This is less than ⌈
√
3(2)⌉ = 3 if all TXs send
Si = M = 16 data streams.
• Note that the number of antennas required for information
leakage neutralization is independent to the number of
frequency subcarriers used by each TX (the number of
non-zero rows of Pi)
5. However, the power required to
neutralize information leakage depends on how crowded
the subcarriers are. If a lot of frequency subcarriers
are occupied, the relay may not have enough power to
neutralize all information leakage as we will see in the
following.
When the number of antennas at the relay is sufficient for
information leakage neutralization, we can use the following
5The reason is that even if a TX does not transmit on a certain frequency,
the relay must make sure that it does not forward the TX’s information on
other subcarriers to this subcarrier at which the eavesdroppers can decode the
information.
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rsi =
(
C



IM +H̄ii Pi P
H
i H̄
H
ii


∑
j 6=i
H̄ij Pj P
H
j H̄
H
ij +G
H
i RR
H Gi + IM


−1



− C
(
IM(K−1) +H̄−i PiP
H
i H̄
H
−i
(
GH−i RR
H G−i+ IM(K−1)
)−1
)
)+
.
(16)
method to compute the relay forwarding matrix R for such
purpose.
Proposition 2: Any relay matrix R satisfying the informa-
tion leakage neutralization constraint (35) has the following
form:
vec(R) = A† b+ z
where
A =
[
((
P̂
T
1 F
T
1
)
⊗GH−1
)H
, . . . ,
((
P̂
T
K F
T
K
)
⊗GH−K
)H
]H
b =
[
− vec
(
H−1 P̂1
)H
, . . . ,− vec
(
H−K P̂K
)H
]H
z ∈ N (A)
and P̂i is a submatrix of Pi, containing its non-zero co-
lumns.
For the proof, please refer to Appendix II. From Proposition
2, it follows that there is a minimum power requirement for
information leakage neutralization.
Corollary 1: The minimum power required for information
leakage neutralization is
Pmaxr ≥
(
A† b
)H
((
K
∑
i=1
Fi Pi P
H
i F
H
i + IMN
)
⊗ IMN
)
(
A† b
)
.
For the proof, please refer to Appendix III. Depending on
the available transmit power at the relay, one may only
have enough power to neutralize information leakage but not
enough power to further improve the transmission rates. If
there is limited power resource and therefore one must ensure
secure transmission with as little power as possible, then one
can set z in Proposition 2 to zero. If there is a high priority
of secrecy rates and with abundant transmit power, one can
optimize z for the purpose of sum secrecy rate maximization.
In the following, we investigate algorithms to address these
applications.
IV. INFORMATION LEAKAGE NEUTRALIZATION
ALGORITHMS
In the previous section, we have shown that secrecy rates
(17) are achievable by information leakage neutralization. Al-
so, in order to implement information leakage neutralization,
the number of antennas at the relay, the number of frequency
subcarriers and the number of TX-RX pairs in the system
must satisfy the relation in Proposition 1. In Proposition 2,
we computed the minimum relay power required in order
to perform information leakage neutralization. With more
power available at the relay, we can improve the achievable
secrecy rates by optimizing the relay matrix and the precoding
matrices. The optimization of sum secrecy rates can be written
formally in the following:
max
R,{Pi}
K
∑
i=1
C
(
IM +H̄ii PiP
H
i H̄
H
ii Ξ
−1
i
)
such that H̄ii = Hii +G
H
i RFi,
Ξi = G
H
i RR
H Gi + IM ,
tr
(
Pi P
H
i
)
≤ Pmaxi ,
tr
(
R
(
K
∑
i=1
Fi Pi P
H
i F
H
i
)
RH
)
≤ Pmaxr .
In the following, we propose two algorithms. The com-
putation of the algorithms are assumed to be performed at
the relay because the relay has not only more computation
power but is also able to gather the channel state information
from different transmitters and receivers in the system. We
assume that the transmitters and receivers are willing to feed
back their channel state information to the relay and in return
get an improved secrecy rate performance. After the relay
performs the computation, the precoding design Pi is fed back
to transmitter i. The first algorithm EFFIN, in Section IV-A,
considers the scenario where z = 0 in Proposition 2 and all
TXs transmit the maximum number of data streams allowed
Si = M . We observe that in this situation, information lea-
kage neutralization decomposes the system into KM parallel
channels and consequently both the relay processing matrix R
and the precoding matrix Pi can be computed very efficiently.
The second algorithm LOPTIN, in Section IV-B, investigates
a systematic method for the computation of R and Pi when
there is enough transmit power budget at the relay to allow
further optimization of secrecy rates.
A. Efficient Information Leakage Neutralization (EFFIN)
When every TX transmits Si = M data streams and
Pi is invertible, we propose the following algorithm that
decomposes the K users interference relay channels with
M frequency subcarriers and N antennas at the relay to
KM parallel secure channels with no interference and no
information leakage. The information leakage neutralization
criteria
(
Hij +G
H
i RFj
)
Pi = 0, when Pi is invertible, is
equivalent to
Hij +G
H
i RFj = 0 .
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Due to the block diagonal structure of Hij , Gi and Fj , one
feasible solution of the above equation is a block diagonal R.
With the block diagonal structure, the resulting secrecy rates
may be suboptimal, but the information leakage neutralization
constraint can be broken down to the optimization over the
diagonal blocks Rmm in R:
hji(m) + g
H
j (m)Rmm f i(m) = 0, i, j = 1, . . . ,K, i 6= j.
(22)
Following the same approach as before, we stack the cons-
traints for all j 6= i and define
h−i(m) =
[
hH1i(m), . . . , h
H
(i−1)i(m), h
H
(i+1)i(m), . . . , h
H
Ki(m)
]H
G−i(m) =
[
g1(m), . . . ,gi−1(m),gi+1(m), . . . ,gK(m)
]
.
We obtain h−i(m)+G
H
−i(m)Rmm f i(m) = 0(K−1)×1 which
is equivalent to
(
fTi (m)⊗GH−i(m)
)
vec (Rmm) = −h−i(m).
Stacking constraints for all i, we have
A(m) =
[(
fT1 (m)⊗GH−1(m)
)
; . . . ;
(
fTK(m)⊗GH−K(m)
)]
,
b(m) = [−h−1(m); . . . ;−h−K(m)] .
(23)
With a limited power budget at relay, we propose to implement
information leakage neutralization with the least relay transmit
power and utilize the result from Proposition 2, the relay
matrix has the m-th diagonal block equal to
Rmm = vec
−1
(
(A(m))
†
b(m)
)
(24)
where vec(.)−1 is to reverse the vectorization of a vector
columnwise to a M ×M matrix. After the computation of the
relay matrix in (24), R = diag (R11, . . . ,RMM ), the optimal
precoding matrices {Pi} are computed by solving Q1.
Q1 : max
{Q
i
},Q
i
0
K
∑
i=1
C (IM +QiWi)
such that tr (Qi) ≤ Pmaxi , i = 1, . . . ,K,
K
∑
i=1
tr (Qi Xi) ≤ P̄maxr .
We replace Pi P
H
i by positive semi-definite variable Qi and
denote the following matrices
Wi =
(
Hii+G
H
i RFi
)H
·
(
GHi RR
H Gi + IM
)−1 (
Hii +G
H
i RFi
)
,
Xi = F
H
i R
H RFi,
P̄maxr = P
max
r − tr
(
RRH
)
.
(25)
The objective in Q1 is concave in Qi as Wi is positive semi-
definite and the constraints are linear in Qi. Thus, Q1 is a
semi-definite program and can be solved readily using convex
optimization solvers, e.g. CVX6. The optimal Pi is obtained
by performing eigenvalue decomposition on Qi = Ui DiU
H
i
and Pi = Ui D
1/2
i . The pseudo-code of the EFFIN is given
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The pseudo-code for Efficient Information Lea-
kage Neutralization (EFFIN)
1: for m = 1 → M do ⊲ Compute block diagonal relay
processing matrix
2: Compute Rmm = vec
−1
(
(A(m))
†
b(m)
)
with
A(m) and b(m) defined in (23).
3: end for
4: The relay processing matrix is R =
diag (R11, . . . ,RMM ).
5: Solve Q1 using convex optimization solvers and obtain
optimal {Qi}.
6: for i = 1 → K do ⊲ Compute precoding matrices
7: Perform eigen-value decomposition, Qi = Ui Di U
H
i .
Set Pi = Ui D
1/2
i .
8: end for
B. Local-Optimized Information Leakage Neutralization
(LOPTIN)
In the previous subsection, we have discussed a simple,
efficient and relay transmit power saving solution of the relay
matrix and precoding matrices for secure transmission. One
drawback of the efficient method is that its performance may
be suboptimal. In this subsection, we discuss how to choose
the relay and precoding matrices such that the sum secrecy
rates are optimized while ensuring zero information leakage.
To this end, we rewrite the information leakage neutrali-
zation constraint (18) to promote the optimization of secrecy
rates,
(
H+GH RF
)
P = T (26)
where H = [H11, . . . ,H1K ; . . . ;HK1, . . . ,HKK ],
GH =
[
GH1 ; . . . ;G
H
K
]
, F = [F1, . . . ,FK ] and
P = diag(P1, . . . ,PK). The block diagonal matrix
T = diag(T1, . . . ,TK) is the new optimization variable.
Ti is the equivalent desired channel from TX i to RX i as
Ti = (Hii +G
H
i RFi)Pi. By applying pseudo-inverses
7 of
GH and FP (GH † and (FP)
†
respectively), one can rewrite
(26) to the following
R = GH † (T−HP) (FP)† . (27)
6Given block diagonal R in (24), the equivalent channel Wi and matrix
Xi are also block diagonal. It is possible to solve Q1 using water-filling
with K + 1 Lagrange multipliers. For large problem size, it may be more
computational efficient using a tailor made water-filling method. For medium
size problems and illustrative purposes, we propose here to solve by semi-
definite programming.
7Note that GH has dimension MK × MN and FP has dimension
MN ×KM . If MN ≥ MK , then GH † = G
(
G
H
G
)−1
and (FP)† =
(
(FP)H (FP)
)−1
(FP)H. If MN < KM , then GH † =
(
GG
H
)−1
G
and (FP)† = (FP)H
(
FP (FP)H
)−1
.
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The maximum achievable sum secrecy rate is the solution of
the following problem
max
R,T,{Pi}
K
∑
i=1
C
(
IM +Ti PiP
H
i T
H
i ·Ξ−1i
)
(28a)
such that Ξi = G
H
i RR
H Gi + IM , (28b)
tr
(
Pi P
H
i
)
≤ Pmaxi , i = 1, . . . ,K, (28c)
(
H+GH RF
)
P = T, (28d)
tr
(
R
(
FPPH FH + IMN
)
RH
)
≤ Pmaxr
(28e)
T = diag (T1, . . . ,TK) . (28f)
Note that in the objective function, the information leakage is
neutralized for each TX-RX pair. Constraints (28c) and (28e)
are the transmit power constraints at the TXs and at the relay
respectively. The information leakage neutralization constraint
is written as (28d). The optimization is not jointly convex in
R, T and {Pi}. To simplify the optimization problem, we
propose the following iterative optimization algorithm. Given
R and T, we solve Pi optimally using Q1 in EFFIN. The
second part of the iterative algorithm is to compute the optimal
relay strategy R and the auxiliary variable T (by solving Q2)
if the precoding matrices Pi as the solutions of Q1 are given.
Q2 :
max
R,T
K
∑
i=1
C
(
IM +TiT
H
i
(
GHi RR
H Gi + IM
)−1
)
such that R = GH † (T−HP) (FP)† ,
tr
(
R
(
FPPH FH + IMN
)
RH
)
≤ Pmaxr ,
T = diag(T1, . . . ,TK).
Problem Q2 is non-convex. The major challenge is due to
the sum of log-determinants in the objective function and
the equality constraints. In the following, we utilize the first
equality constraint and replace R as a function of T. The
optimization problem Q2 can be written as,
Q′2 :
max
T
K
∑
i=1
(
C
(
Xi +T̄i Zi T̄
H
i
)
− C
(
Xi+T̄i Yi T̄
H
i
))
such that tr
(
GH † (T−HP)
(
F̃+ IMK
)
·
(T−HP)H G†
)
≤ Pmaxr ,
T̄i = [Ti, IM ] ,
T = diag(T1, . . . ,TK).
The variables Xi,Yi,Zi, F̃ are defined as follows
F̃ = (FP)
†
(FP)
H †
, Xi =
K
∑
m=1
K
∑
l=1
Him Pm F̃ml P
H
l H
H
il ,
Yi =
[
F̃ii −
∑K
l=1 F̃il P
H
l H
H
il
−∑Km=1Him Pm F̃mi IM
]
,
Zi =
[
IM 0M
0M 0M
]
+Yi .
Please see the proof in Appendix IV. Although the optimi-
zation problem is simplified, it is still non-convex in T. In
the following, we propose to solve Q′2 with gradient descent
method. To this end, we write the Lagrangian of Q′2 as L(T, λ)
in (29) and the gradient of the Lagrangian with respect to T∗ in
(30) at the top of next page. Please see the proof in Appendix
V. We update the new variable T(t+1) at the t+1-th iteration
to be the sum of the current variable T(t) and the product of
the derivative and ǫ,
T(t+1) = T(t) +ǫDT∗(T, λ) (31)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier and ǫ is chosen as
ǫ = argmax
ǫ≥0
(
L(T∗, λ) + ǫDT∗(T(t), λ)
)
. (32)
This update step, termed as gradient ascent method, steers
the operating point towards a new operating point in the
direction of the greatest increment of the objective function.
This guarantees an increase in the objective.
We summarize in Algorithm 2 the proposed iterative algo-
rithm on sum secrecy rate optimization. The algorithm first
Algorithm 2 The pseudo-code for Local-Optimized Informa-
tion Leakage Neutralization (LOPTIN)
1: while do ⊲ Compute relay processing matrix
2: Initialize {Pi} and R as the solutions of EFFIN.
3: Solve Q′2 using gradient descent method with gradient
(30) and obtain optimal solution T. Obtain relay proces-
sing matrix R from T using (27).
4: With R and T above, solve Q1 using convex optimi-
zation solvers and obtain optimal {Qi}.
5: for i = 1 → K do ⊲ Compute precoding matrices
6: Perform eigen-value decomposition, Qi =
Ui Di U
H
i . Set Pi = Ui D
1/2
i .
7: end for
8: if sum secrecy rate improvement is less than a
predefined threshold then
9: Convergence reached. Break.
10: end if
11: end while
initializes the choice of beamforming matrices {Pi} and the
relay matrix R using EFFIN. Then the algorithm optimizes
the relay matrix R using a gradient ascent method. With
the optimized R, {Pi} is obtained by solving a convex
optimization problem Q1. Then the algorithm iterates until the
achievable secrecy rate at the current iteration is less than the
achievable secrecy rate at the previous iteration plus a small
9
L(T, λ) =
K
∑
i=1
(
C
(
Xi +T̄i Zi T̄
H
i
)
− C
(
Xi+T̄i Yi T̄
H
i
))
− λ
(
tr
(
GH † (T−HP)
(
F̃+ IMK
)
(T−HP)H G†
)
− Pmaxr
)
=
K
∑
i=1
fi(Ti)− λg(T).
(29)
DT∗ L(T, λ) =
1
ln(2)





DT∗
1
f1(T1) 0M . . . 0M
0M DT∗
2
f2(T2) . . . 0M
. . .
...
0M . . . DT∗
K
fK(TK)





− λG†GH † (T−HP)
(
F̃+ IKM
)
.
(30)
predefined constant ǫ. Since at each step of the optimization,
we guarantee an increase of the secrecy rate and the secrecy
rate is naturally finite due to finite power, we conclude that
the proposed algorithm converges to a local optimum.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
To illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms,
we provide in this section numerical simulations for different
system settings. As an example, we simulate the secrecy
rates of a relay assisted network with K = 2 TX-RX pairs,
M = 8 frequency subcarriers and N = 2 antennas at the
relay, unless otherwise stated. To examine the performance
of the algorithms with respect to the system’s signal-to-noise
ratio, we vary the transmit power constraint at the relay from
0 to 30 dB while keeping the transmit power constraint at
the TXs at 10 dB (see Figure 3.) Similarly, we examine the
algorithms by varying the transmit power constraint at the
TXs from 0 to 30 dB while keeping the transmit power at
the relay constrained at 23, 27, 30 dB. Note that by varying the
power constraints, we do not force the power of the optimized
precoding matrices and the relay processing matrix to be equal
to the power constraints. In the following, we compare the
following algorithms:
• Baseline 1 (Repeater): the relay is a layer-1 relay and is
only able to forward signals without additional signal pro-
cessing. This corresponds to setting R = IMN
√
Pmax
r
MN .
• Baseline 2 (IC): the relay shuts down, i.e. R = 0MN ,
and we obtain an interference channel where the RXs
eavesdrop each other.
• Proposed algorithm EFFIN: an efficient relay and preco-
ding matrices optimization algorithm outlined in Algo-
rithm 1.
• Proposed algorithm LOPTIN: an local-optimal algorithm
whose performance exceeds EFFIN with a price of higher
complexity. LOPTIN is outlined in Algorithm 2.
For each baseline algorithm, we examine the effect of spec-
trum sharing on achievable secrecy rates by employing either
one of the following spectrum sharing methods:
• Full spectrum sharing (FS): TXs are allowed to use the
entire spectrum. Each TX measures the channel qualities
of the direct channel and the channel from itself to other
RXs. Based on the measured channel qualities, each TX
excludes frequency subcarriers with zero secrecy rates
and transmits on the channels with non-zero secrecy
rates. For subcarriers at which more than one TX would
like to transmit, we assume that the TXs coordinate so
that the TX with a high secrecy rate would transmit
on that subcarrier. Despite such coordination, each RX
eavesdrops other TX-RX pairs on each subcarrier.
• Orthogonal spectrum sharing (OS): TXs are assigned
exclusive portion of spectrum. Each TX excludes subcar-
riers with zero secrecy rates and transmits on the channels
with non-zero secrecy rates. Each RX eavesdrops other
TX-RX pairs on each subcarrier.
A. Secrecy rates with increasing relay power
In Figure 3, we show achievable sum secrecy rates over
the transmit power constraint at the relay from 0 to 30 dB
while keeping the transmit power constraint at the TXs at
10 dB. As the IC does not utilize the relay, the achievable sum
secrecy rates (plotted with triangles) are constant as the relay
power constraint increases. As expected from intuition, the
performance of IC with FS is better than OS because OS has an
additional constraint of subcarrier assignment. The achievable
sum secrecy rates achieved by a repeater decreases with relay
transmit power. This is due to the increased amplification noise
in AF relaying. Interestingly, the non-intelligent relaying sche-
me, e.g. a repeater, may decrease the secrecy rate significantly,
even worse than switching off the relay. However, utilizing an
intelligent relay and choosing the relaying scheme, one can
improve the achievable secrecy rate significantly, about 550%
over a simple repeater and about 200% over IC. Although
EFFIN is very simple and efficient, it achieves 94.5% of the
sum secrecy rate achieved by the more complicated algorithm
LOPTIN with EFFIN as initialization point and 88% of that
by LOPTIN with 6 randomized initialization points. Each
initialization point leads to a potentially different convergence
point in LOPTIN and the maximum out of the converged sum
secrecy rates is plotted in solid black curve with diamond
marks.
The saturation of the secrecy rates is due to the nature of
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Fig. 3. The achievable secrecy rates of a two-user interference relay channel
with 8 frequency subcarriers is shown with varying relay power constraint.
The TX power constraints are 10 dB and there are two antennas at the relay.
The proposed scheme EFFIN and LOPTIN outperform baseline algorithms
Repeater and IC by 550% and 200% respectively.
the amplify-and-forward relaying and the fixed transmit power
of the transmitters. Since the relay is chosen to neutralize
information leakage and therefore mutual interference at the
same time, the signal-to-noise ratio is the ratio of the desired
signal power to the sum of amplification noise and background
noise power. When the transmit powers of the transmitters
are kept constant, the increase of relay power increases both
the desired signal power and the amplification noise power,
causing the saturation of the signal-to-noise ratio and con-
sequently the secrecy rate. In order for the secrecy rate to
scale indefinitely, both the transmit power and the relay power
should be increased at the same time as shown in Figure 4.
B. Secrecy rates with increasing TX power
In Figure 4, we simulate the achievable sum secrecy rate
by the transmit power constraint at TXs from 0 to 30 dB
while keeping the transmit power at relay constrained at
23, 27, 30 dB. As the transmit power at the TX increases,
the sum secrecy rates saturate in both baseline algorithms,
Repeater and IC. With the proposed information leakage neu-
tralization, we see that the sum secrecy rates grow unbounded
with the TX power as each TX-RX pair enjoys a leakage free
frequency channel. Note that the sum secrecy rates achieved
by relay with power constraint at 23, 27, 30 dB are plotted in
dotted, dashed and solid lines respectively. When there is only
23 dB available, there is only enough power for information
leakage neutralization, but not enough to further optimize the
system performance. Hence, the achievable sum secrecy rates
of EFFIN and LOPTIN overlap. With more power available, it
is possible to optimize the sum secrecy rates while neutralizing
information leakage and the performance of LOPTIN is better
than EFFIN.
C. Secrecy rates with larger systems
In Figure 5, we examine the performance of the proposed
algorithms in a slightly larger systems with N = 4 antennas
at the relay and M = 16 frequency subcarriers. The relay
processing matrix is therefore a 64× 64 matrix. The proposed
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unbounded with the transmit power at TX whereas the secrecy rates achieved
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Fig. 5. The achievable sum secrecy rates of a two-user interference relay
channel with 16 frequency subcarriers and 4 antennas at the relay is shown
with varying relay power constraint. The TX power constraints are 10 dB
and there are two antennas at the relay. The proposed scheme EFFIN and
LOPTIN outperform baseline algorithms Repeater and IC by 200%. EFFIN
achieves 94.86% of the sum secrecy rate performance by LOPTIN.
scheme EFFIN and LOPTIN outperform baseline algorithms
Repeater and IC by 200% whereas the efficient EFFIN algo-
rithm achieves 94.86% of the sum secrecy rate performance
achieved by LOPTIN.
VI. FUTURE EXTENSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed two relay design for the sum
secrecy rates maximization on the multi-carrier relay-assisted
interference channel, by utilizing the concept of information
leakage neutralization. A natural and very essential extension
of this work is to investigate the appropriate strategies in
scenarios where the relay does not have perfect channel
information of the interference network. The relay is assumed
to have perfect channel information for channels going to
and leaving from the relay as the relay should be able
to estimate these channels in the corresponding uplink and
downlink transmissions. However, the channel coefficients of
the channels that do not go through the relay are fed back
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to the relay by the transmitters and receivers and therefore
are prompt to be imperfect. In such scenario, the relay is
not able to completely neutralize information leakage. It is
interesting to investigate the robustness of the information
leakage neutralization scheme. At an extreme situation where
the channel information is completely outdated, the relay may
be able to improve the achievable secrecy rate by transmitting
an artificial noise signal. The cut off point of channel informa-
tion outdatedness for the transition from information leakage
neutralization to artificial noise should be computed.
If the transmitters are equipped with multiple transmit
antennas and the receivers are equipped with single antenna,
the results obtained in this paper can be applied directly. This
is because the addition of spatial dimension due to transmit
antennas have the same effects of the multi-frequency channel
studied in the manuscript. When the receivers are allowed
to have multiple antenna, the problem becomes significantly
more complicated because the relay or the transmitters are not
able to predict the receive filters processing at the eavesdrop-
pers.
One possible future extension is to integrate both artificial
noise and information leakage neutralization in the following:
yr = R(xr +nr) +Rw w (33)
where yr,xr are the output and input of the relay respectively;
nr is the background noise at relay; w is the artificial noise
vector and Rw is the corresponding precoding matrix for
the artificial noise vector. By choosing both R and Rw,
the relay can also take the role of a helper which transmits
artificial noise. Note that the usage of artificial noise does
not guarantee zero information leakage whereas information
leakage neutralization sets the equivalent channel to zero and
guarantees zero information leakage. In the scenario where
information leakage neutralization is not possible, e.g., when
the relay does not have enough power or antennas, it is
possible to increase the secrecy rate by using artificial noise.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
If TX i transmits Si ≤ M data streams, then M − Si
columns of Pi are zeros. For example, in a system with 4
subcarriers where TX i transmits 2 data streams spread over
3 subcarriers, Pi has the following form,
Pi =




∗ ∗ 0 0
∗ ∗ 0 0
0 0 0 0
∗ ∗ 0 0




. (34)
Denote the non-zero columns of Pi by P̂i ∈ CM×Si . The
information leakage constraint (18) is equivalent to
(
Hji +G
H
j RFi
)
P̂i = 0, i, j = 1, . . . ,K, i 6= j.
(35)
For each i, we stack the constrains for all j 6= i by using GH−i
from (15) and defining
H−i = [H
H
1i, . . . ,H
H
(i−1)i,H
H
(i+1)i, . . . ,H
H
Ki]
H.
We write (35) as
(
H−i +G
H
−i RFi
)
P̂i = 0, i = 1, . . . ,K (36)
which can be manipulated to the following by performing
vectorization on the matrices,
((
P̂
T
i F
T
i
)
⊗GH−i
)
vec(R) = − vec
(
H−i P̂i
)
, i = 1, . . . ,K.
(37)
The matrix H−i has dimension (K − 1)M × M and the
matrix P̂i has dimension M ×Si. Hence, the product H−iPi
has dimension (K − 1)M × Si. The number of constraints
in (37) is the number of elements in H−iPi, which is
(K − 1)MSi. Summing up all constraints for i = 1, . . . ,K ,
we have the total number of constraints (K − 1)M∑Ki=1 Si.
The number of variables is the number of elements in R
which equals to M2N2. To neutralize information leakage
at all users, we must satisfy (37) for all i. To this end,
the relay must have the number of antennas N satisfying
M2N2 ≥ (K − 1)M∑Ki=1 Si, or
N ≥
√
√
√
√
K − 1
M
K
∑
i=1
Si. (38)
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Stacking the matrices in (35) for all i, we obtain
A vec(R) = b. The matrix A is a block matrix with vertically
stacked blocks
(
P̂
T
i F
T
i
)
⊗ GH−i , for i = 1, . . . ,K , and
therefore has dimension
∑K
i=1 Si(K − 1)M × M2N2. The
matrix G−i concatenates matrices Gj for j 6= i, e.g., G−1 =
[G2, . . . ,GK ]. As G−i are not mutually independent, A is
of low rank. Denote the number of rows of A by α =
∑K
i=1 Si(K − 1)M and the rank of A by β = rank(A). The
pseudo-inverse of A can be computed by performing singular-
value-decomposition on A,
[A]α×M2N2
= [U1 |U2]
[
Γ 0β×(M2N2−β)
0(α−β)×β 0(α−β)×(M2N2−β)
] [
VH1
VH2
]
,
(39)
where U1 ∈ Cα×β,U2 ∈ Cα×(α−β) are the left singular
vectors in the signal space and null space of A respectively;
VH1 ∈ Cβ×M
2N2 , VH2 ∈ C(M
2N2−β)×M2N2 are the right
singular vectors in the signal space and null space of A
respectively; Γ ∈ Cβ×β holds the non-zero singular values
in the diagonal and zeros everywhere else. Thus, the solution
of vec(R) satisfying A vec(R) = b is
vec(R) = V1 Γ
−1 UH1 b+V2 y (40)
where y is any vector in the space of CM
2N2×1. The result
follows by setting z = V2 y as a vector in the null space of
A.
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APPENDIX III
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Using the properties of Kronecker products, the
relay transmit power from (12) is equivalent to
(
A† b+ z
)
H
((
∑
K
i=1
Fi Pi P
H
i
FH
i
+ IMN
)
⊗ IMN
)(
A† b+ z
)
. By
Proposition 2 and (12), the minimum transmit power required
to satisfy information leakage neutralization is attained when
z = 0 . This is due to the fact that z is in the null space
of A and Q =
(
∑
K
i=1
Fi Pi P
H
i
FH
i
+ IMN
)
⊗ IMN is positive
semi-definite and zH Qz ≥ 0 for any z.
APPENDIX IV
FORMULATION OF Q′2
Let ETi = e
T
i ⊗ IM , T̄i = [Ti, IM ] and
F̃ = (FP)
†
(FP)
H †
,Xi =
K
∑
m=1
K
∑
l=1
Him Pm F̃ml P
H
l H
H
il ,
Yi =
[
F̃ii −
∑K
l=1 F̃il P
H
l H
H
il
−∑Km=1 Him Pm F̃mi IM
]
,
Zi =
[
IM 0M
0M 0M
]
+Yi .
(41)
With the equality constraint (26), the amplification noise can
be written as (42) where F̃ml ∈ CM is the (m, l)-th block
matrix in F̃. As a result, the objective can be written as
K
∑
i=1
C
(
IM +TiT
H
i
(
GHi RR
H Gi + IM
)−1
)
=
K
∑
i=1
(
C
(
IM +Ti T
H
i +G
H
i RR
H Gi
)
− C
(
IM +G
H
i RR
H Gi
)
)
=
K
∑
i=1
(
C
(
Xi+T̄i Zi T̄
H
i
)
− C
(
Xi +T̄iYi T̄
H
i
)
)
.
Similarly, the power constraint is written as (43).
APPENDIX V
COMPUTATION OF THE GRADIENT OF LAGRANGIAN (29)
We compute the gradient of the Lagrangian (29) with
respect to T,
DT∗ L(T, λ) = DT∗
K
∑
i=1
fi(Ti)− λDT∗ g(T).
As fi(Ti) is independent to Tj for j 6= i, the derivative can
be written in a block diagonal form
DT∗ L(T, λ)
= diag
(
DT∗
1
f1(T1), . . . ,DT∗
K
fK(TK)
)
− λDT∗ g(T).
(44)
The gradient of the objective function fi(Ti) with respect to
T∗i is
DT∗
i
fi(Ti)
= DT∗
i
C
(
Xi+T̄i Zi T̄
H
i
)
−DT∗
i
C
(
Xi+T̄iYi T̄
H
i
)
.
(45)
We begin with
ln(2)DT∗
i
C
(
Xi+T̄i Zi T̄
H
i
)
= DT̄∗
i
ln det
(
Xi +T̄i Zi T̄
H
i
)
· DT∗
i
T̄
∗
i
= vec
(
(
Xi +T̄i Zi T̄
H
i
)−1
T̄i Zi
)T
· ∂ vec(T̄
∗
i )
∂ vec(T∗i )
= vec
(
(
Xi +T̄i Zi T̄
H
i
)−1
T̄i Zi
)T [
IM2
0M2
]
=
[
(
Xi+T̄i Zi T̄
H
i
)−1
T̄i Zi
]
(:,1:M)
=
(
Xi+T̄i Zi T̄
H
i
)−1
T̄i
[
IM +F̃ii
−∑Km=1 Him Pm F̃mi
]
.
(46)
Similarly, we have
ln(2)DT∗
i
C
(
Xi+T̄i Yi T̄
H
i
)
=
(
Xi+T̄i Yi T̄
H
i
)−1
T̄i
[
F̃ii
−∑Km=1 Him Pm F̃mi
]
.
(47)
Thus, we have the gradient of fi(Ti) as
DT∗
i
fi(Ti)
=
1
ln(2)
(
(
Xi +T̄i Zi T̄
H
i
)−1
T̄i
[
IM +F̃ii
−∑Km=1 Him Pm F̃mi
]
−
(
(
Xi+T̄i Yi T̄
H
i
)−1
T̄i
[
F̃ii
−∑Km=1 Him Pm F̃mi
])
.
(48)
The last step of computing the gradient of the Lagrangian is
to compute
DT∗ tr
(
GH † (T−HP)
(
F̃+ IKM
)
(T−HP)H G†
)
= G†GH † (T−HP)
(
F̃+ IKM
)
.
(49)
Combining (44), (48) and (49), the gradient of the Lagrangian
is obtained.
REFERENCES
[1] Z. K.-M. Ho, E. Jorswieck, and S. Gerbracht, “Efficient Information
Leakage Neutralization on a Relay-assisted Multi-carrier Interference
Channel,” in Proceedings of ICASSP, 2013.
[2] F. Mattern, “Wireless Future : Ubiquitous Computing,” in Proceedings
of Wireless Congress, 2004, pp. 1–10.
[3] Y. Liang, H. V. Poor, and S. Shamai (Shitz), Information Theoretic
Security, Now Publishers Inc., 2009.
[4] R.-H. Liu and W. Trappe, Eds., Securing Wireless Communications at
the Physical Layer, Springer, 2009.
[5] M. Bloch and J. Barros, Physical-Layer Security: From Information
Theory to Security Engineering, Cambridge University Press, 2011.
[6] A. D. Wyner, “The Wiretap Channel,” Bell Systems Technology Journal,
vol. 54, pp. 1355– 1387, 1975.
13
GHi RR
H Gi = E
T
i G
H RRH GEi
= ETi (T−HP) (FP)† (FP)H † (T−HP)H Ei
= [−Hi1 P1, . . . ,Ti −Hii Pi, . . . ,−HiK PK ]



F̃11 . . . F̃1K
...
. . .
...
F̃K1 . . . F̃KK











−PH1 HHi1
...
THi −PHi HHii
...
−PHK HHiK








=
K
∑
m=1
K
∑
l=1
Him Pm F̃ml P
H
l H
H
il −Ti
K
∑
l=1
F̃il P
H
l H
H
il −
K
∑
m=1
Him Pm F̃miT
H
i +Ti F̃ii T
H
i
= Xi − IM + [Ti, IM ]
[
F̃ii −
∑K
l=1 F̃il P
H
l H
H
il
−∑Km=1 Him Pm F̃mi IM
]
[
THi
IM
]
= Xi − IM +T̄iYi T̄Hi ,
(42)
tr
(
R
(
FPPH FH + IMN
)
RH
)
= tr
(
GH † (T−HP) (FP)†
(
FPPH FH + IMN
)
(FP)
†H
(T−HP)H G†
)
= tr
(
GH † (T−HP)
(
(FP)† (FP)†H + IKM
)
(T−HP)H G†
)
= tr
(
GH † (T−HP)
(
F̃+ IKM
)
(T−HP)H G†
)
≤ Pmaxr .
(43)
[7] Y.-S. Shiu, S.-Y. Chang, H.-C. Wu, S. C.-H. Huang, and H.-W. Chen,
“Physical Layer Security in Wireless Networks: A Tutorial,” IEEE
Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 66–74,
Apr. 2011.
[8] H. V. Poor, “Information and Inference in the Wireless Physical Layer,”
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 40–
47, Feb. 2012.
[9] G. Zheng, L. C. Choo, and K. K. Wong, “Optimal Cooperative Jamming
To Enhance Physical Layer Security Using Relays,” IEEE Transactions
on Signal Processing, vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 1317–1322, Mar. 2011.
[10] L. Dong and H. Jafarkhani, “Cooperative Jamming and Power Allocation
for Wireless Relay Networks in Presence of Eavesdropper,” in Pro-
ceedings of IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC),
2011.
[11] J. Huang and A. L. Swindlehurst, “Cooperative Jamming for Secure
Communications in MIMO Relay Networks,” IEEE Transaction on
Signal Processing, vol. 59, no. 10, pp. 4871–4884, Oct. 2011.
[12] L. Lai and H. El Gamal, “The Relay-Eavesdropper Channel: Cooperation
for Secrecy,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 54, no. 9,
pp. 4005–4019, Sept. 2008.
[13] R. Bassily and S. Ulukus, “Deaf Cooperation for Secrecy with Multiple
Antennas at the Helper,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics
and Security, vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 1855 – 1864, Dec. 2012.
[14] L. Dong, Z. Han, A. P. Petropulu, and H. V. Poor, “Improving Wireless
Physical Layer Security via Cooperating Relays,” IEEE Transactions
on Signal Processing, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 1875–1888, Mar. 2010.
[15] D. W.-K. Ng, E. S. Lo, and R. Schober, “Secure Resource Allocation and
Scheduling for OFDMA Decode-and-Forward Relay Networks,” IEEE
Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 10, no. 10, pp. 3528–
3540, Oct. 2011.
[16] R. Bassily and S. Ulukus, “Secure Communication in Multiple Relay
Networks Through Decode-and-Forward Strategies,” Journal of Com-
munications and Networks, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 352–363, Aug. 2012.
[17] X. He and A. Yener, “Cooperation With an Untrusted Relay: A Secrecy
Perspective,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 56, no. 8,
pp. 3807–3827, Aug. 2010.
[18] H. Khodakarami and F. Lahouti, “Link Adaptation for Fixed Relaying
with Untrusted Relays: Transmission Strategy Design and Performance
Analysis,” in Proceedings of International Conference on Telecommu-
nications, 2011, pp. 309–314.
[19] C. Jeong, I. M. Kim, and D. I. Kim, “Joint Secure Beamforming
Design at the Source and the Relay for an Amplify-and-Forward MIMO
Untrusted Relay System,” IEEE Transaction on Signal Processing, vol.
60, no. 1, pp. 310 – 325, Jan. 2012.
[20] E. A. Jorswieck and A. Wolf, “Resource Allocation for the Wire-Tap
Multi-Carrier Broadcast Channel,” in Proceedings of 2008 International
Conference on Telecommunications, June 2008, pp. 1–6.
[21] X.-W. Wang, M.-X. Tao, J.-H. Mo, and Y.-Y. Xu, “Power and Subcarrier
Allocation for Physical-Layer Security in OFDMA-Based Broadband
Wireless Networks,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and
Security, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 693–702, Sept. 2011.
[22] F. Renna, N. Laurenti, and H. V. Poor, “Physical-Layer Secrecy for
OFDM Transmissions Over Fading Channels,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Forensics and Security, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 1354–1367, Aug.
2012.
[23] C. Jeong and I.-M. Kim, “Optimal Power Allocation for Secure
Multicarrier Relay Systems,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing,
vol. 59, no. 11, pp. 5428–5442, Nov. 2011.
[24] S. Berger, M. Kuhn, and A. Wittneben, “Recent Advances in Amplify-
and-Forward Two-Hop Relaying,” IEEE Communications Magazine,
vol. 47, no. 7, pp. 50–56, July 2009.
[25] A. El Gamal and N. Hassanpour, “Relay-without-Delay,” in Proceedings
of International Symposium on Information Theory, 2005, vol. 1, pp.
1078–1080.
[26] A. El Gamal, N. Hassanpour, and J. Mammen, “Relay Networks With
Delays,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 53, no. 10, pp.
3413–3431, Oct. 2007.
[27] V. R. Cadambe and S. A. Jafar, “Degrees of Freedom of Wireless
Networks with Relays, Feedback, Co-operation and Full Duplex Ope-
ration,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 55, no. 5, pp.
2334–2344, May 2009.
[28] N. Lee and S. A. Jafar, “Aligned Interference Neutralization and
the Degrees of Freedom of the 2 User Interference Channel with
Instantaneous Relay,” submitted to IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1102.3833, pp. 1–17, 2011.
[29] IEEE Std. 802.16j-2009, “IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan
Area Networks - Part 16: Air Interface for Fixed Broadband Wireless
Access Systems - Amendment 1: Multiple Relay Specification,” 2009.
[30] E. Seidel, “Initial Thoughts on LTE Advanced for 3GPP Release 10,”
in LTE World Summit, Berlin, 2009.
[31] S. Mohajer, S. N. Diggavi, C. Fragouli, and D. N. C. Tse, “Transmission
Techniques for Relay-Interference Networks,” in 2008 46th Annual
Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Sept.
2008, pp. 467–474.
14
[32] S. Mohajer, S. N. Diggavi, and D. N. C. Tse, “Approximate Capacity
of a Class of Gaussian Relay-Interference Networks,” in 2009 IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory, June 2009, vol. 57,
pp. 31–35.
[33] S. Berger and A. Wittneben, “Cooperative Distributed Multiuser MMSE
Relaying in Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks,” in Proceedings of Asilomar
Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, 2005, pp. 1072–1076.
[34] B. Rankov and A. Wittneben, “Spectral Efficient Protocols for Half-
duplex Fading Relay Channels,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in
Communications, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 379–389, Feb. 2007.
[35] Z. K.-M. Ho and E. Jorswieck, “Instantaneous Relaying: Optimal
Strategies and Interference Neutralization,” IEEE Transactions on Signal
Processing, vol. 60, no. 12, pp. 6655 – 6668, Dec. 2012.
[36] S. Gerbracht, E. A. Jorswieck, G. Zheng, and B. Ottersten, “Non-
regenerative Two-Hop Wiretap Channels using Interference Neutraliza-
tion,” in Proceedings of IEEE International Workshop on Information
Forensics and Security (WIFS), 2012.
[37] M. Bloch and J. Barros, Physical Layer Security From Information
Theory to Security Engineering, Cambridge University Press, 2011.
[38] A. Khisti and G. Wornell, “Secure Transmission with Multiple Antennas
- Part II: The MIMOME Wiretap Channel,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 56, no. 11, pp. 5515 – 5532, Nov. 2010.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank the editor and all the
reviewers for their helpful comments.
Zuleita Ho Zuleita K.-M. Ho (S’06-M’10) received
her Ph.D. in wireless communication from EURE-
COM and Telecom Paris, France in 2010. In 2005
and 2007, She received her Bachelor and Master in
Philosophy degree in Electronic Engineering (Wi-
reless Communication) from Hong Kong University
of Science and Technology (HKUST). From 2003 to
2004, she studied as a visiting student in Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology (MIT) supported by the
HSBC scholarship for Overseas Studies. From 2011
till now, she has joined Chair for Communications
Theory, Technische Universität Dresden, Germany. Zuleita enrolled into
HKUST in 2002 through the Early Admission Scheme for gifted students.
In 2003, she received the HSBC scholarship for Overseas Studies and visited
MIT for 1 year. In 2007, she received one of the most prestigious scholarships
in Hong Kong, The Croucher Foundation Scholarship , which supports her
doctorate education in France. Other scholarships received include Sumida
and Ichiro Yawata Foundation (2004, 2006), The Hong Kong Electric Co Ltd
Scholarship (2004) and The IEE Outstanding Student Award (2004).
Eduard Jorswieck Eduard A. Jorswieck (S’01-
M’05-SM’08) received his Diplom-Ingenieur degree
and Doktor-Ingenieur (Ph.D.) degree, both in elec-
trical engineering and computer science from the
Berlin University of Technology (TUB), Germany, in
2000 and 2004, respectively. He was with the Fraun-
hofer Institute for Telecommunications, Heinrich-
Hertz-Institute (HHI) Berlin, from 2001 to 2006. In
2006, he joined the Signal Processing Department at
the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) as a post-
doc and became a Assistant Professor in 2007. Since
February 2008, he has been the head of the Chair of Communications Theory
and Full Professor at Dresden University of Technology (TUD), Germany. His
research interests are within the areas of applied information theory, signal
processing and wireless communications. He is senior member of IEEE and
elected member of the IEEE SPCOM Technical Committee. From 2008-2011
he served as an Associate Editor and since 2012 as a Senior Associate Editor
for IEEE SIGNAL PROCESSING LETTERS. Since 2011 he serves as an
Associate Editor for IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SIGNAL PROCESSING.
Since 2013, Eduard serves as Associate Editor for IEEE Transactions on
Wireless Communications. In 2006, he was co-recipient of the IEEE Signal
Processing Society Best Paper Award.
Sabrina Gerbracht Sabrina Gerbracht received the
Diplom Medien-Informatiker (M.S.) degree in media
computer science from the Technische Universität
Dresden (TUD), Germany, in 2007, where she is
currently pursuing the Ph.D. degree. Since June
2007, she has been a Research Assistant with the
Communications Laboratory, Department of Electri-
cal and Computer Engineering, TUD. Her research
interests include the fields of physical layer secrecy,
wireless communications, and signal processing.
15
